Dark Forest Defense - Zenpower Security Posture

Last updated 20 Dec 2025, 09:27

Version: 1.0 Date: December 2025 Status: Pre-Mainnet Security Review

Executive Summary

The "Dark Forest" is a security paradigm describing Ethereum's mempool as a predatory environment where:

All pending transactions are public (visible to everyone)
Automated bots (searchers/MEV extractors) constantly scan for profit opportunities
Any value-revealing transaction will be attacked (front-run, sandwich, back-run)

This document maps Dark Forest attack vectors to Zenpower's smart contract and crypto infrastructure, and prescribes defensive measures.

1. The Dark Forest Paradigm

1.1 Origin

The term comes from Dan Robinson and Georgios Konstantopoulos's 2020 research, inspired by Liu Cixin's "Three-Body Problem" novel. In the story, civilizations must remain silent because any signal attracts predators that will destroy them.

In Ethereum:

The mempool is the dark forest
Your transaction is the signal
MEV bots are the predators
Value extraction is the kill

1.2 MEV (Maximal Extractable Value)

MEV refers to the maximum value that can be extracted from block production beyond standard block rewards, through:

Attack Type	Description	Example
Front-running	Copy a profitable tx with higher gas	Seeing a large DEX buy, buying first
Back-running	Profit from state changes your tx creates	Arbitrage after a price-moving trade
Sandwich	Front-run + back-run combined	Buy before victim, sell after
Liquidation sniping	Race to liquidate undercollateralized positions	Monitoring lending protocols
Time-bandit	Reorg blocks to capture past MEV	Rare but possible

1.3 Why This Matters for Zenpower

Zenpower operates across multiple crypto surfaces:

SIWE Wallet Authentication - Sign-In with Ethereum
ZENCOIN ERC-20 Token - Governance and utility
TheForge Contract - Time-locked minting mechanism
ZenpowerGovernor - DAO voting
ZenpowerTreasury - Funds management with timelock
ZenTropy - Gaming with real-value payouts
Punk Seed NFTs - Soulbound identity on Base L2

Each component has distinct Dark Forest exposure profiles.

2. Zenpower Attack Surface Analysis

2.1 SIWE Authentication

Risk Level: LOW

Why: SIWE signatures happen off-chain. The signed message never enters the mempool—it's verified server-side.

Attack Vectors:

None specific to Dark Forest
Standard SIWE risks (session hijacking) are separate concerns

Status: ✅ Protected by design

2.2 TheForge Contract

Risk Level: MEDIUM-HIGH

Attack Vectors:

Claim Front-Running
- User calls claimForge(forgeId, backendSignature)
- Bot sees tx in mempool, extracts signature
- Bot submits same call with higher gas
- Mitigation needed: Signature binds to msg.sender
Start Forge Sniping
- User starts forge with valuable path
- Bot monitors for path availability changes
- Mitigation: Not directly exploitable (per-user paths)
Parameter Extraction
- Bot monitors forge completions to learn optimal strategies
- Mitigation: This is acceptable information leakage

Current Protections:

✅ Signature includes user address (forge is user-specific)
✅ forgeId is unique per operation
⚠️ Backend signature could theoretically be reused if nonce protection weak

Recommended Defenses:

// Ensure signature is bound to msg.sender
function claimForge(bytes32 forgeId, bytes calldata signature) external {
    // Signature must include msg.sender in the signed data
    address signer = _recoverSigner(
        keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, forgeId, /* other params */)),
        signature
    );
    require(signer == backendSigner, "Invalid signature");
    // ... rest of claim logic
}

2.3 Governance & Treasury

Risk Level: LOW (by design)

Why: The 48-hour timelock on treasury operations is intentionally public. This is a feature, not a bug—it allows the community to see and respond to queued operations.

Attack Vectors:

Front-Running Treasury Withdrawals
- Bot sees queued withdrawal, positions to benefit
- Mitigation: Timelock delay means no urgency—market adjusts
Governance Proposal Manipulation
- Flash loan to accumulate voting power
- Protection: 1-day voting delay makes this expensive

Status: ✅ Acceptable risk for DAO transparency

2.4 ZenTropy Gaming Payouts

Risk Level: MEDIUM

Attack Vectors:

Withdrawal Queue Sniping
- User submits withdrawal request
- Bot monitors for approval patterns
- Mitigation: Weekly batch processing (no real-time exploitability)
RNG Prediction
- If RNG is predictable, bots can game outcomes
- Mitigation: VRF (Verifiable Random Function) proofs required
Payout Address Replacement
- Man-in-the-middle on payout address
- Mitigation: Wallet address set at registration, change requires verification

Current Architecture:

User Request → PostgreSQL Queue → Weekly Treasury Review → Bitcoin Payout

Recommended Defenses:

✅ Batch processing eliminates real-time MEV opportunities
⚠️ Implement commit-reveal for large withdrawals
⚠️ Add fraud proof window for contested payouts

2.5 Punk Seed NFT Minting

Risk Level: MEDIUM

Attack Vectors:

Mint Front-Running
- Bot sees user's mint tx, mints first to claim desirable token ID
- Mitigation: Token ID assigned server-side, or random
Authorization Signature Replay
- Similar to TheForge, backend signature could be extracted
- Mitigation: Signature must include msg.sender
Base L2 Sequencer Risks
- Base uses a centralized sequencer—less MEV than Ethereum mainnet
- Status: Lower risk, but not zero

Recommended Contract Pattern:

// PunkSeed.sol - Mint with server authorization
function mint(
    address to,
    bytes32 commitment,
    bytes calldata signature
) external {
    require(to == msg.sender, "Can only mint to self");
    require(!usedCommitments[commitment], "Commitment already used");

    address signer = ECDSA.recover(
        _hashTypedDataV4(keccak256(abi.encode(
            MINT_TYPEHASH,
            to,
            commitment
        ))),
        signature
    );
    require(signer == authorizedMinter, "Invalid minter signature");

    usedCommitments[commitment] = true;
    _safeMint(to, _nextTokenId++);
}

2.6 DEX Interactions (Future)

Risk Level: HIGH (if exposed)

If Zenpower ever adds:

ZENCOIN liquidity pools
Token swaps in the UI
Bridge operations

These are classic Dark Forest targets.

Defense Strategies:

Defense	Description	Implementation
Private Mempools	Submit txs via Flashbots Protect	Use RPC: `https://rpc.flashbots.net`
MEV Blocker	Route through MEV-blocking services	CoWSwap, 1inch Fusion
Slippage Limits	Tight slippage prevents sandwich profit	Max 0.5% for normal trades
TWAP Orders	Spread large trades over time	Use TWAP DEX aggregators

3. Defense Implementation Checklist

3.1 Critical (Pre-Mainnet)

Verify TheForge signature binds to msg.sender
- Check _recoverSigner includes msg.sender
- Test with signature extracted from different address
Implement nonce tracking for all signatures
- Add mapping(bytes32 => bool) usedSignatures
- Mark signature hash as used after first call
Migrate to EIP-712 typed data signing
- Include chain ID
- Include contract address
- Include clear type structure
Add commitment scheme for Punk Seed mints
- Commit hash in tx 1
- Reveal + mint in tx 2
- Front-runner can't know what they're minting

3.2 High Priority (Pre-Launch)

Configure Flashbots RPC for frontend
- Route user transactions through private mempool
- Prevents standard front-running
Document MEV risks in user terms
- "Transactions may be visible to other network participants"
- "Use Flashbots Protect for sensitive operations"
Implement transaction simulation
- Simulate tx before sending
- Warn user if MEV extraction detected
Add emergency withdrawal circuit breaker
- Rate limit large withdrawals
- Require time delay for amounts > threshold

3.3 Medium Priority (Post-Launch)

Set up MEV monitoring dashboard
- Track sandwich attacks on Zenpower users
- Alert on unusual MEV patterns
Integrate with MEV protection services
- Evaluate Flashbots, MEV Blocker, Eden Network
- Consider running own searcher for user protection
Implement gasless meta-transactions
- User signs intent
- Relayer submits tx (hides user identity)
- Absorbs MEV risk

4. Private Transaction Strategies

4.1 Flashbots Protect

What: Private mempool—txs go directly to block builders, not public mempool.

How to use:

// In frontend wallet config
const flashbotsRpc = "https://rpc.flashbots.net";

// MetaMask custom network
{
  chainId: "0x1",
  chainName: "Ethereum (Flashbots)",
  rpcUrls: ["https://rpc.flashbots.net"],
  // ...
}

Recommendation: Add this as default RPC for Zenpower dApp.

4.2 MEV Blocker

What: Service that auctions your tx to searchers who compete to give you MEV rebates.

URL: https://mevblocker.io

How to use: Add custom RPC to wallet.

4.3 Commit-Reveal Pattern

What: Two-phase transaction that hides intent.

Pattern:

Commit: hash(secret + intent) submitted on-chain
Wait: At least 1 block
Reveal: Submit secret + intent, contract verifies hash

Example:

mapping(address => bytes32) public commitments;
mapping(address => uint256) public commitBlock;

function commit(bytes32 hash) external {
    commitments[msg.sender] = hash;
    commitBlock[msg.sender] = block.number;
}

function reveal(uint256 amount, bytes32 secret) external {
    require(block.number > commitBlock[msg.sender], "Too early");
    require(
        keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender, amount, secret))
        == commitments[msg.sender],
        "Invalid reveal"
    );
    delete commitments[msg.sender];
    // Execute action
}

5. Monitoring & Detection

5.1 MEV Detection Signals

Signal	Indicates	Action
Tx reverted after being in mempool	Front-run or sandwich	Investigate, warn user
Unusual gas price patterns	MEV bot competition	Log for analysis
Same-block opposing trades	Sandwich attack	Alert and document
Large slippage on swaps	MEV extraction	Post-mortem review

5.2 Tools

Tool	Purpose	URL
EigenPhi	MEV transaction explorer	https://eigenphi.io
Flashbots Explorer	Bundle and MEV tracking	https://explore.flashbots.net
MEV-Inspect	Open-source MEV analysis	https://github.com/flashbots/mev-inspect-py
Dune Analytics	Custom MEV dashboards	https://dune.com

5.3 Recommended Monitoring

# Example: Monitor for sandwich attacks on Zenpower users
def detect_sandwich(tx_hash):
    block = get_block_containing(tx_hash)
    tx_index = get_tx_index(tx_hash, block)

    # Check for suspicious pattern
    before_tx = block.transactions[tx_index - 1]
    after_tx = block.transactions[tx_index + 1]

    if (same_token_pair(before_tx, after_tx) and
        opposite_direction(before_tx, after_tx) and
        same_sender(before_tx, after_tx)):
        return SandwichAttack(
            victim=tx_hash,
            attacker=before_tx.sender,
            profit=calculate_profit(before_tx, after_tx)
        )
    return None

6. Risk Matrix

6.1 Current State

Component	MEV Exposure	User Impact	Priority
SIWE Auth	None	None	-
TheForge Claims	Medium	Medium	HIGH
Governance	Low	Low	LOW
ZenTropy Payouts	Low	Medium	MEDIUM
Punk Seed Mints	Medium	Low	MEDIUM
DEX Swaps (future)	High	High	CRITICAL

6.2 After Mitigations

Component	MEV Exposure	User Impact	Status
SIWE Auth	None	None	✅
TheForge Claims	Low	Low	After nonce fix
Governance	Low	Low	✅
ZenTropy Payouts	Low	Low	After commit-reveal
Punk Seed Mints	Low	Low	After commitment scheme
DEX Swaps	Medium	Medium	With Flashbots

7. Incident Response

7.1 If MEV Attack Detected

Immediate: Document the attack (tx hashes, amounts, addresses)
Short-term: Warn affected users, enable protective measures
Medium-term: Patch vulnerable code paths
Long-term: Update threat model, improve monitoring

7.2 Communication Template

Subject: Security Notice - MEV Protection Update

We detected [describe attack type] affecting [X] transactions on [date].

What happened:
- [Brief technical description]

User impact:
- [Who was affected, what they lost/risked]

Our response:
- [Immediate actions taken]
- [Planned improvements]

Your action:
- [What users should do]

For detailed technical analysis: [link to post-mortem]

8. References

Ethereum is a Dark Forest - Original paper
Escaping the Dark Forest - samczsun's rescue story
Flashbots Documentation
MEV Wiki
EIP-712: Typed structured data hashing
OpenZeppelin ECDSA

Appendix A: Quick Reference - When to Worry

Action	Dark Forest Risk?	Defense
User signs SIWE message	No	N/A
User starts forge	Low	Signature is user-bound
User claims forge reward	Medium	Ensure signature binds to msg.sender
User votes on proposal	Low	ERC20Votes checkpoints protect
Treasury executes payout	Low	Timelock is public by design
User withdraws from ZenTropy	Low	Batch processing + review
User mints Punk Seed	Medium	Use commit-reveal pattern
User swaps tokens on DEX	HIGH	Flashbots Protect required

9. Ecosystem Integration: Punk MUD & ZenTropy

The Dark Forest doesn't just apply to raw blockchain transactions. Every Zenpower experience has attack surfaces.

9.1 Punk Grid MUD

The MUD (Multi-User Dungeon) integrates crypto identity through Punk Seed NFTs.

Attack Surfaces:

Component	Vector	Risk	Defense
SIWE Session	Session hijacking	Medium	Secure cookies, short TTL
Room Navigation	State manipulation	Low	Server-authoritative
Level Gating	Bypass checks	Medium	Server-side verification
Hidden Exits	Information leak	Low	Access logged server-side
Soulbound Items	Fake claims	Medium	On-chain verification
Community Rooms	Malicious content	Medium	Review queue, reporting

Specific Defenses:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    MUD SECURITY LAYERS                           │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│  1. IDENTITY LAYER (Wallet + Punk Seed)                         │
│     └─ SIWE session required                                     │
│     └─ Punk Seed NFT ownership verified on-chain                │
│     └─ Level/traits read from contract                          │
│                                                                  │
│  2. ACCESS LAYER (Room Permissions)                             │
│     └─ All access checks server-side                            │
│     └─ No client-side level/trait trust                         │
│     └─ Hidden exits never sent until revealed                   │
│                                                                  │
│  3. STATE LAYER (Game State)                                    │
│     └─ PostgreSQL for permanent state                           │
│     └─ Redis for transient (players in room)                    │
│     └─ Optimistic locking for concurrent updates                │
│                                                                  │
│  4. MODERATION LAYER (Community Safety)                         │
│     └─ Report system                                            │
│     └─ Suspension capability (Punk Seed flag)                   │
│     └─ Room review queue for community zones                    │
│                                                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

MUD-Specific Checklist:

SIWE session validation on every command
Punk Seed ownership checked at room entry
Hidden exits never exposed in client until conditions met
Rate limiting on commands (anti-spam)
Community room content review before publication
Graffiti/message content filtering

9.2 ZenTropy Gaming

Real-value gaming has the highest stakes for Dark Forest attacks.

Attack Surfaces:

Component	Vector	Risk	Defense
RNG	Prediction	Critical	VRF proofs, commit-reveal
Betting	Front-running	Medium	Time-locked reveals
Payouts	Manipulation	High	Batch processing, multisig
Leaderboards	Sybil	Medium	Punk Seed uniqueness
Quests	Automation	Low	CAPTCHA, behavior analysis

RNG Security (Critical):

# NEVER use predictable randomness
# BAD: block.timestamp, block.number, blockhash
# GOOD: VRF (Verifiable Random Function)

class SecureRNG:
    """
    ZenTropy RNG must be:
    1. Unpredictable before commit
    2. Verifiable after reveal
    3. Resistant to miner manipulation
    """

    async def generate_outcome(self, bet_id: str) -> Outcome:
        # 1. User commits bet (hashed intent)
        # 2. Wait for block confirmation
        # 3. Combine user seed + block hash + server seed
        # 4. Produce VRF proof
        # 5. Outcome is deterministic from inputs

        vrf_proof = self.vrf.prove(
            user_seed=bet.user_seed,
            server_seed=self.current_server_seed,
            block_hash=await self.get_confirmed_block_hash(bet.block),
        )

        return Outcome(
            result=vrf_proof.output,
            proof=vrf_proof.proof,
            verifiable=True,
        )

Payout Security Flow:

┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│                    ZENTROPY PAYOUT SECURITY                      │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│                                                                  │
│  1. WIN EVENT                                                   │
│     └─ RNG produces verifiable proof                            │
│     └─ Proof stored with payout record                          │
│     └─ Immediate credit to PostgreSQL ledger                    │
│                                                                  │
│  2. WITHDRAWAL REQUEST                                          │
│     └─ User initiates (rate-limited: 1 per hour)               │
│     └─ Funds locked in ledger                                   │
│     └─ Added to weekly batch queue                              │
│                                                                  │
│  3. TREASURY REVIEW (Weekly)                                    │
│     └─ Verify all RNG proofs                                    │
│     └─ Check for anomalous patterns                             │
│     └─ Multisig approval required                               │
│                                                                  │
│  4. SETTLEMENT                                                  │
│     └─ Bitcoin transaction broadcast                            │
│     └─ 6 confirmations required                                 │
│     └─ Funds deducted from locked                               │
│                                                                  │
│  SAFETY MECHANISMS:                                             │
│     └─ Daily payout limit: 100 BTC                              │
│     └─ Single payout limit: 10 BTC                              │
│     └─ Suspicious activity = manual review                      │
│     └─ Circuit breaker: pause if anomalies detected             │
│                                                                  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘

9.3 Minecraft Bot

The Zenpower Minecraft bot has different attack surfaces.

Relevant Concerns:

Component	Vector	Risk	Defense
Bot Commands	Injection	Medium	Input sanitization
Economy	Duplication	Low	Server-side validation
Identity	Impersonation	Low	Discord/wallet linking

Note: Minecraft operates outside Ethereum's Dark Forest but still requires security hygiene.

9.4 Mindset Explorer

Mental health tools require extra privacy.

Attack Surfaces:

Component	Vector	Risk	Defense
Wallet Linking	Identity correlation	Medium	Optional, user-controlled
Session Data	Privacy leak	High	Encryption at rest
Progress Tracking	Profiling	Medium	Minimal data retention

Privacy-First Principles:

Wallet linking is optional
No on-chain storage of mental health data
Local-first storage where possible
Clear consent for any data collection

10. The Whole World Is a Dark Forest

10.1 Beyond Ethereum

The Dark Forest metaphor extends beyond blockchain:

Domain	"Mempool" Equivalent	"Predators"
Ethereum	Transaction mempool	MEV bots
Internet	Network traffic	ISPs, surveillance
Social Media	Public posts	Algorithms, bad actors
Finance	Order books	HFT, front-running
Real World	Your presence	Those who would exploit

10.2 Zen Response to the Dark Forest

The Dark Forest is a reality. How do we navigate it with integrity?

Zenpower's Approach:

Acknowledge the predators exist
- We don't pretend the world is safe
- We document threats openly
- We prepare defenses
Protect users by default
- Privacy-first architecture
- Minimal data collection
- Encryption everywhere
Transparency about risks
- Users know what's public
- Clear warnings before exposure
- Educational content on self-protection
Community as defense
- Shared threat intelligence
- Collective monitoring
- Mutual aid in incidents
Peace despite the forest
- We build safe spaces (MUD zones, moderated areas)
- We create value despite predators
- We refuse to become predators ourselves

10.3 The Zen of Security

The Dark Forest is not a reason for despair.
It is a reason for wisdom.

    Know what you're revealing.
    Protect what matters.
    Share what builds trust.
    Build what creates value.

The forest is dark because we haven't
    yet learned to shine together.

11. Implementation Priority Matrix

Immediate (Before Any Mainnet)

Task	Component	Effort	Impact
Nonce-based signature replay protection	TheForge	Medium	Critical
EIP-712 typed data signing	All contracts	Medium	High
VRF implementation for ZenTropy	Gaming	High	Critical
Server-side MUD access validation	Punk Grid	Low	High

Pre-Launch

Task	Component	Effort	Impact
Flashbots RPC integration	Frontend	Low	High
Batch payout security review	ZenTropy	Medium	Critical
Community room moderation system	MUD	Medium	Medium
Rate limiting across all APIs	All	Low	Medium

Post-Launch

Task	Component	Effort	Impact
MEV monitoring dashboard	All	Medium	Medium
Automated anomaly detection	ZenTropy	High	High
Bug bounty program	All	Medium	High
Quarterly security audits	All	High	High

Document Version: 1.0 Last Updated: December 2025 Owner: Zenpower Security Team Next Review: Post external audit

"In the dark forest, silence is survival. In Ethereum, privacy is protection."

"But in Zenpower, we choose to shine together—building light in the darkness, one room at a time."